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Forecast targeting is an innovation in central banking that represents an important step toward more
rule-based policymaking, even if it is not an attempt to follow a policy rule of any of the types that
have received primary attention in the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy. This paper
discusses the extent to which forecast targeting can be considered an example of a policy rule, and
the conditions under which it would represent a desirable rule, with a view to suggesting improvements
in the approaches currently used by forecast-targeting central banks. Particular attention is given to
the intertemporal consistency of forecast-targeting procedures, the assumptions about future policy
that should be used in constructing the forecasts used in such procedures, the horizon with which the
target criterion should be concerned, the relevance of forecasts other than the inflation forecast, and
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michael.woodford@columbia.eduFor several decades, John Taylor has advocated an ambitious program of research
on quantitative rules that could serve as guidelines for monetary policy. While the
comparative study of historical performance under alternative policies has helped to
shape Taylor's views (Taylor, 1999b), probably the most distinctive element of his
approach to the problem has been his use of macroeconometric models for the nor-
mative analysis of alternative policy rules (Taylor, 1979, 1993b, 1999c). In addition
to his important contributions to the technical methods for the development, estima-
tion, and numerical analysis of such models, Taylor has constantly been concerned
with the issue of the robustness of policy proposals to model uncertainty (Taylor,
1999a), and with the distillation of the results of the research literature into a form
that could in°uence actual policy (Taylor, 1993a, 1998).
To what extent has the literature that Taylor has launched arrived at conclusions
that are likely to help to improve the conduct of policy by central banks? In my view,
the most important recent development with regard to the practical use of policy rules
has been the development, at several central banks since the early 1990s, of methods
of forecast targeting, both as a systematic approach to monetary policy deliberations
and as a basis for communication with the public.1 Forecast targeting relies heavily
on the use of quantitative structural models of the e®ects of monetary policy, and
in this respect at least the success of the approach relies heavily on the output of
the research program promoted by Taylor. Moreover, forecast targeting implies a
decision process focused on the achievement of speci¯c quantitative objectives, and
typically implies a greater degree of explicitness about both the goals of policy and the
justi¯cation of particular policy decisions than is seen at other central banks; in these
respects, it represents an important step toward the ideal of rule-based policymaking.
I believe that the most likely way in which the research literature on monetary policy
rules can help to improve actual policy is through contributing to the re¯nement of
forecast-targeting procedures.
One cannot say, however, that forecast targeting, as developed at central banks
1The banks that best illustrate this approach all have in°ation targets, which play a prominent
role in their targeting approaches; and Svensson (1997) refers to the type of policy regime with
which I am concerned as \in°ation-forecast targeting." But I wish to discuss the optimal design
of a forecast targeting regime without necessarily assuming that only the in°ation forecast should
play a role | indeed, I shall argue below that normative policy analysis indicates a role for other
projections as well | and so I prefer to speak simply of \forecast targeting." Earlier discussions of
forecast targeting as a general approach include Svensson (2003, 2007) and Svensson and Woodford
(2005).
1in the early 1990s, represented an attempt to implement ideas from the theoretical
literature on monetary policy rules. Nor has the extensive literature on monetary
policy rules of the past two decades given a great deal of attention to the analysis
of procedures of this kind. This paper seeks to examine the extent to which forecast
targeting does represent a desirable policy rule, from the standpoint of what Taylor
(2000) calls \the new normative macroeconomics," and the extent to which theoret-
ical analyses of optimal monetary policy can provide guidelines that should improve
the operation of forecast targeting regimes. In seeking to ¯nd connections between
the theoretical literature and a policy framework, developed on the basis of primar-
ily practical considerations, that is currently used at a number of central banks, it
represents an essay in what Taylor (1998) calls \translational economics."
1 Forecast Targeting as a Policy Rule
It is ¯rst important to be clear about what I mean by forecast targeting. Lars
Svensson (1997) introduced the term \in°ation-forecast targeting" (IFT) to refer to
a policy regime with more speci¯c characteristics than the mere announcement of an
in°ation target, though the existence of a public target for some measure of in°ation
is an important feature of such regimes. First of all, IFT involves a commitment to a
particular decision procedure for monetary policy: the central bank's operating target
for the policy instrument should be adjusted in the way that is judged necessary
in order to ensure that the bank's projections of the economy's future evolution
satisfy certain conditions, which I shall call the target criterion, at all times. The
instrument of policy is typically an overnight interest rate in an interbank market,
similar to the federal funds rate in the US, though this is not essential to the logic
of forecast targeting, and neither is it a feature that distinguishes this approach
from the current conduct of policy at most other central banks, such as the Fed.
The target criterion should be a speci¯c quantitative property of the projections, so
that (in principle at least) there should be little debate about whether a given set
of projections satisfy the target criterion, even if a great deal of judgment may be
involved in producing the projections themselves. As an example of what is intended,
the Bank of England has often described its decision procedure as checking that the
projection for a particular variable (currently, CPI in°ation) equals a particular value
(the o±cial in°ation target, currently 2.0 percent) at a particular horizon (8 quarters
2in the future).2
And secondly, forecast targeting involves a distinctive approach to communication
policy, under which the central bank regularly publishes the quantitative projections
on the basis of which policy has been judged to be on track, together with extensive
discussion of the reasoning underlying these projections. This is a key feature of
the In°ation Reports that are published three or four times per year by the leading
practitioners of IFT, such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England,
Sweden's Riksbank, and the Norges Bank.3 Forecast-targeting central banks have led
the way in increasing the transparency of monetary policy deliberations, most notably
through these publications, and this is not fortuitous. For the decision procedure
associated with forecast targeting both lends itself more easily to such communication
(because it is highly structured) and is particularly dependent on transparency for
its success (because the procedure would involve little discipline if the central bank
did not have to discuss its projections with anyone outside its own walls).
To what extent can a regime of this kind be considered an example of a policy
rule? One might think that it is not a rule at all | or at least, not a rule that is
su±ciently well-speci¯ed to be subjected to the kind of quantitative analysis that is
the hallmark of the Taylor research program | insofar as no precise recipe is given
for the adjustment of a policy instrument, or even a precise speci¯cation of some
\intermediate target" that can be in°uenced relatively directly by the central bank.
And it is true that forecast targeting represents a di®erent style of speci¯cation of a
policy rule | what Svensson and Woodford (2005) call a \higher-level speci¯cation"
of the policy rule | than such familiar examples of policy rules as Milton Friedman's
proposal of a constant target for money growth, or the \Taylor rule" (Taylor, 1993a).
2See, for example, Vickers (1998) and Goodhart (2001). The justi¯cations given for policy
decisions in the Bank of England's In°ation Report more recently do not suggest quite so simple
a target criterion; for example, there are frequent references to in°ation projections beyond the
8-quarter horizon, as well as to the projection for output growth. However, the introduction to each
In°ation Report still always includes a chart showing the projection for CPI in°ation, just before the
summary discussion of the most recent policy decision, and this chart always includes a horizontal
line at the in°ation target of 2.0 percent and a dashed vertical line at the horizon 8 quarters in the
future, allowing easy visual inspection of the degree to which the simple target criterion is satis¯ed.
3The latter two central banks have recently changed the name of their publications to Monetary
Policy Report, presumably in recognition of the fact that the in°ation projection is not the sole
focus of these publications.
3Nonetheless, such a regime does serve many of the most important objectives
that proponents hope to achieve through adoption of a policy rule.4 First, it does
increase the systematic character of policy decisions. Even if actual forecast targeting
regimes have not made policy decisions as simple as some proposals in the academic
literature would, they represent a substantial movement in this direction relative to
the procedures actually followed by other central banks. This has multiple advan-
tages: in addition to potentially improving the reliability of policy decisions (both
by structuring policy deliberations, and by allowing accumulated wisdom to be more
e±ciently transmitted to new members of the policy committee), it helps to reduce
political interference in central-bank deliberations. (It is surely no accident that the
Bank of England was granted independent authority to set interest rates only after
¯ve years of experience with its IFT regime.)
And secondly, a forecast targeting regime serves to make policy decisions more
easily forecastable by the private sector. This increases the e®ectiveness of policy for
two somewhat di®erent reasons.5 On the one hand, the actual e®ects of monetary
policy on spending decisions and ultimately on the rate of in°ation occur largely as a
result of the e®ect of central-bank actions and announcements on market expectations
regarding the future path of short-term interest rates, rather than through direct
e®ects of the current level of overnight rates itself. Hence achieving the e®ects of
policy that are desired depends on private-sector expectations regarding agreeing
with the intentions of the central bank. And on the other hand, the bene¯ts of price
stability very much depend on the degree to which economic actors remain con¯dent
of the stability of the monetary unit. Anchoring in°ationary expectations is therefore
important, and one of the most important arguments for commitment to a policy rule
is the expectation that such a commitment should give people a better ground for
expecting a particular future rate of in°ation. But an IFT regime, if implemented in
a credible way, is well suited to stabilize such expectations. In addition to making
visible the central bank's commitment to a systematic procedure that is intended to
ensure a stable rate of in°ation over the medium run, the constant emphasis in public
communications on the central bank's own forecast of future in°ation can only help to
4Taylor (1998) provides a useful list of reasons for the growing consensus among monetary
economists regarding the desirability of a policy rule.
5This issue is discussed in more detail in Woodford (2005).
4ensure that the public understands this aspect of the policy's intended consequences.6
In thinking about whether a forecast-targeting procedure constrains central-bank
behavior to a su±cient extent to achieve the bene¯ts that one hopes to obtain from
a policy rule, it is useful to recognize that the conduct of policy under such a regime
can actually be described at three distinct levels. At the highest level of generality, a
speci¯cation of the target criterion explains what projected outcome the central bank
is seeking to achieve through its choice of its operating target for overnight interest
rates, though it does not specify exactly what the interest-rate target should be. At
a more speci¯c level, one could instead describe the speci¯c procedure that should
be used to determine the appropriate interest-rate choice in each decision cycle, in
order to satisfy the target criterion, but without specifying exactly which repurchase
operations should be conducted on any given day. And ¯nally, at the most speci¯c
level, one could describe the way in which the central bank decides each day on the
appropriate quantity of cash to supply to the money markets through its repurchase
operations, in order to achieve its operating target for the policy rate. At each
successively lower level of the speci¯cation, one comes closer to saying precisely what
the central bank ultimately must do. At each lower level, ¯ner institutional details
about the precise mechanism through which monetary policy a®ects the economy
become relevant. And ¯nally, at each lower level, it is appropriate for the central
bank to be prepared to adjust course more frequently on the basis of more recent
information. At the lowest level, a decision about the quantity of repurchases must
be made daily (at most central banks), and occasionally even more frequently; at the
intermediate level, the interest-rate operating target is ordinarily reconsidered only at
intervals of several weeks; and at the highest level, the target criterion should remain
¯xed for years at a time, though here too reconsiderations will be appropriate from
time to time in light of improved understanding or in response to structural change
in the economy.
At which, or how many, of these levels must the nature of policy be spelled out, in
6A public commitment to a money growth rate target, by contrast, only direct helps to stabilize
in°ation expectations to the extent that members of the public understand the economic theory
according to which a given rate of money growth should imply a particular rate of in°ation, at least
over long enough periods of time. Of course, any rule that succeeds in maintaining in°ation at a
low and stable rate over a period of time should eventually result in stable in°ation expectations
as a consequence of observed performance; but an IFT regime has this virtue to the same extent as
other proposed rules.
5order for the policy speci¯cation to count as a \rule"? I think there is wide agreement
that there is no need for explicit description of the lowest-level speci¯cation of policy;
the literature that compares the consequences of alternative policy rules generally
takes it as given that any non-negative target for the policy rate can be implemented
with a high degree of accuracy over time scales (a day or two) that are quite short
compared to those that matter for the e®ects of interest rates on the basis of which
the policy is to be judged, and that the details of the required open-market operations
have little or no consequences for the objectives of policy.
It is less obvious that description of a policy solely at the highest of these three
levels su±ces, and the literature on the quantitative evaluation of policy rules has
almost exclusively focused on rules speci¯ed as formulas to determine the value of
a policy instrument that is under the relatively direct control of the central bank.
Nonetheless, I think there are important advantages to considering rules that are
speci¯ed by target criteria that need not involve any variable over which the central
bank has direct control.
A ¯rst question is whether a mere speci¯cation of a target criterion su±ces to
fully determine outcomes under the policy, so that one can compare the outcomes
associated with alternative policies. The answer is that it can, if one assumes that
the target criterion will be satis¯ed at all times. One need not specify the exact
actions of the central bank that result in its being satis¯ed, in order to ask how
in°ation, output and other variables would have to evolve in a rational expectations
equilibrium of that kind. (In principle, the point is the same as when one proposes
to analyze the consequences of a given interest-rate feedback rule, without specifying
how the central bank will determine the size of repurchase operations that will be
required each day in order to achieve overnight interest rates consistent with the rule
| though admittedly, there is greater reason to question the degree of precision with
which it is feasible to satisfy the target criterion, when it involves variables such as
the overall rate of in°ation.) One can use the target criterion itself as the \missing
equation" that speci¯es monetary policy, allowing a solution (in the case of a suitably
chosen target criterion) for a determinate rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
Hence one can study the advantages of alternative target criteria, using the same
methods as the literature initiated by Taylor has used to assess the advantages of
alternative feedback rules.
Of course, I do not mean to claim that there should be a determinate REE as-
6sociated with any target criterion whatsoever. For example, a criterion that only
involves projected outcomes two or more years in the future is one that is unlikely to
imply a determinate solution; there will be alternative paths by which the economy
could reach a situation consistent with the criterion, and in such a case the target
criterion fails to fully determine policy. In my view, it is important to adopt a target
criterion that does fully determine (but not over-determine) a particular equilibrium.
But this is a property that one can analyze given a speci¯cation of the target criterion
alone; one need not specify the policy at a lower level in order to check this. And
one should recall that there is also a question whether a given interest-rate feedback
rule determines a unique equilibrium or not; one argument for the importance of
choosing a rule that conforms to the \Taylor Principle" is that in many models, rules
with weaker feedback from realized in°ation to the interest-rate operating target have
been found to result in indeterminacy of equilibrium (e.g., Woodford, 2003, chap. 4).
Nor do I wish to suggest that there are no important issues connected with the
problem of implementation of target criteria. However, in the case of a target criterion
that is found to satisfy the property just mentioned | that there exists a determinate
REE associated with it | then there should exist a monetary policy that should
satisfy the target criterion. (In fact, solution for the REE associated with the criterion
should already indicate, among other things, the state-contingent evolution of the
nominal interest rate that must obtain, at least under an REE, if the criterion is to
be satis¯ed.) Thus it is possible to search for a desirable target criterion simply on
the basis of a consideration of alternative policies speci¯ed at this level of generality,
and to turn to the problem of implementation only once one has chosen a target
criterion. (Some of the subtle issues that remain with regard to implementation are
taken up in section 4 below.)
A second question is whether speci¯cation of a target criterion, rather than a
reaction function, is a useful way of providing a guideline for policymakers in their
deliberations. Of course, a monetary policy committee has to decide on the level of
overnight interest rates, so the target criterion alone does not provide them su±cient
information to discharge their duty. Nonetheless, a target criterion relating the paths
of some of the variables that the policy committee wishes to stabilize seems the
appropriate level of detail for a prescription that a policy committee can agree to use
to structure its discussions, that can be explained to new members of the committee,
and that can ensure some degree of continuity in policy over time. Special factors
7are likely to be important at each meeting, in deciding upon the level of interest
rates consistent with ful¯llment of the target criterion; hence it is di±cult to impose
too much structure on this kind of deliberation, without the committee members
feeling that their procedures are grossly inadequate to dealing with the complexity
of the situation in which they ¯nd themselves. But the considerations involved in
a judgment that a particular target criterion is sensible are less likely to constantly
change.
Indeed, there are good theoretical reasons (discussed further in section 3) to ex-
pect that a desirable target criterion will depend on fewer details about the current
economic environment than would a desirable speci¯cation of a reaction function.
Giannoni and Woodford (2002, 2005) show how to construct robustly optimal target
criteria, which implement an optimal response to shocks regardless of which types
of shocks are more important, or of the degree of persistence, forecastability, and so
on of the shocks that occur. The coe±cients of an optimal reaction function will
instead depend on the statistical properties of the shocks.7 Since each shock that
occurs is somewhat di®erent from any other, there will always be new information
about the particular types of disturbances that have most recently occurred, making
advance commitment to a particular reaction function inconvenient. The coe±cients
of the optimal target criterion may also change8 in the event of a shift in the central
bank's estimate of structural parameters such as elasticities of supply or demand; but
information of this kind is not likely to shift as dramatically so suddenly.
Of course, the Taylor rule was not proposed as a mechanical formula that would
precisely determine the federal funds rate operating target at each point in time.
Instead, Taylor (1993a) describes it as a \guideline" that indicates how policy should
be conducted under normal conditions, but from which policymakers will frequently
be justi¯ed in deviating, in response to special circumstances that arise. But an
instrument rule subject to an open-ended escape clause of this kind deserves less to
be called a policy rule than does a target criterion which is intended to be the focus
of policy deliberations under virtually all circumstances, even if the considerations
that should determine the policy rate consistent with the target criterion are not
spelled out in advance. The target criterion approach provides a more consistent
structure for policy deliberations; for example, the rule itself makes it clear when
7This is illustrated by Svensson and Woodford (2005) in the context of a simple example.
8Even this need not be so, as is illustrated by the discussion in section 3.
8new circumstances justify a departure from standard rules of thumb for interest rate
decisions: whenever the new developments cast doubt on one's normal expectations
about the relation between the policy rate and the variables that enter the target
criterion. The targeting approach should make the consequences of the central bank's
decisions more predictable, since one should be able to count on the target variables
satisfying the target criterion to a reasonable extent, even if the path of the policy rate
that this involves will not always be highly predictable. And the targeting approach
provides greater protection against political pressure on policy decisions, since one
need not explain to the politicians why current circumstances should not provide
yet another ¯ne occasion for an exception to the usual rule of thumb; instead, the
discussion can be kept on the plane of the relatively technical issue of which level
of interest rates will lead to paths for in°ation and real activity consistent with the
target criterion.
Yet a third question is whether a target criterion represents a useful way of ex-
plaining the nature of a central bank's policy commitments to the public. Some might
feel that a commitment to aim at satisfaction of a particular target criterion is less
meaningful than a commitment to a particular instrument rule, or even than a com-
mitment to a quantitative target for some \intermediate target" that can be fairly
directly controlled by the central bank, on the ground that it is less speci¯c about
what the central bank will do, so that whether the central bank is actually complying
is less directly veri¯able. But there are two important counter-arguments to such a
view. First, while the target criterion is less explicit about what the central bank
will do with the instruments that it can most directly in°uence, the target criterion
has more explicit implications for the evolution of \target variables" such as the in-
°ation rate; and the main reason for wishing to establish a credible commitment to
a policy rule is to anchor private-sector expectations regarding these variables. And
second, while a \higher-level" description of the policy commitment might seem to
reduce veri¯ability, this problem can be overcome, to an important extent, through a
commitment to public explanation of how policy decisions have been determined by
the target criterion | which is precisely the function served by the discussion of the
bank's quantitative projections in a Monetary Policy Report. Moreover, accountabil-
ity is increased, to the extent that the higher-level commitment represents one that
can actually determine policy decisions more consistently, rather than being subject
to so many \escape clauses" as will inevitably be required in the case of an explicit
9instrument rule.
Another important argument for policy rules does not depend on any supposition
that central bankers have any di±culty determining the action that would best serve
their objectives on any given occasion, or that the private sector may fail to cor-
rectly understand the systematic character of policy. Instead, Kydland and Prescott
(1977) argue that a process of sequential optimization, with no advance commitment
regarding future policy actions, is inherently °awed, on the ground that a sequen-
tial optimizer will never have any reason to take into account the way in which his
systematic (and hence predictable) response to current conditions has shaped prior
expectations, as these expectations are already a historical fact by the time that the
decision has to be made. Commitment to conduct policy in accordance with a rule,
regardless of whether the required actions are those the policymaker would most pre-
fer at the time that the actions are taken, can solve this problem. But to what extent
are forecast-targeting procedures examples of systematic approaches to policy that
avoid the pitfalls of discretionary policymaking identi¯ed by Kydland and Prescott?
Forecast targeting is a sequential decision procedure; rather than choosing a plan
for policy over several years at one time and then sticking to it, new projections are
computed and the targeting exercise is repeated afresh, several times per year. It is
true that it requires a central bank to be clear about its objectives, and clear about
what it expects the e®ects of its policy actions to be; but these are also features of
\discretionary" policy in the sense of Kydland and Prescott. Does forecast targeting
really represent anything other than a more \scienti¯c" way of implementing discre-
tionary policy | one that can therefore more closely approximate the theoretical
model of sequential optimization proposed by Kydland and Prescott, but that does
nothing to overcome the inherent °aws of sequential optimization that they identify?
The answer to this depends on exactly how forecast targeting is implemented. It
might indeed correspond precisely to discretionary policy in the sense of Kydland
and Prescott, and it could also correspond to something less coherent than that, and
even less successful at achieving the bank's stabilization goals. But if appropriately
implemented, a forecast-targeting procedure can address the problem identi¯ed by
Kydland and Prescott; in fact, under ideal circumstances, it can provide a convenient
approach to implementation of the equilibrium that would result from a once-and-
for-all commitment to an optimal state-contingent policy. But achieving or even
approaching this ideal requires that one be careful about a number of details of what
10is meant by forecast targeting.
2 The Problem of Intertemporal Consistency
An important potential advantage of forecast targeting, stressed above, is the possi-
bility that the published projections can help to clarify what the private sector should
expect, and thus prevent the bank's stabilization objectives from being thwarted by
private actions based on mistaken forecasts. But the degree to which publication of
central-bank projections can be expected to shape the expectations of private de-
cisionmakers will depend on how credible these projections are as forecasts of the
economy's likely evolution. Among the possible grounds for doubt is a tension inher-
ent in the logic of the forecast-targeting procedure itself. Production of projections of
the economy's evolution several years into the future requires that the central bank
make assumptions about its conduct of policy not merely in the immediate future,
but over the entire forecast horizon (and even beyond, in the case of a forward-looking
model). But while the projections must specify policy far into the future each time
they are produced, in each decision cycle policy is only chosen for a short period of
time (say, for the coming month, after which there will be another decision).
This raises a question as to whether this decision procedure should be expected
to actually produce the kind of future policy that is assumed in the projections. One
might imagine, for example, a central bank wishing always to choose expansionary
policy at the present moment, to keep employment high, while projecting that in°a-
tion will be reduced a year or two in the future, so that the expectation of disin°ation
will make it possible to have high employment with only moderate in°ation. But if
the procedure is one in which the disin°ation is always promised two years farther in
the future, private decisionmakers have no reason ever to expect any disin°ation at
all.
Thus one requirement for credibility of the central bank's projections is that the
forecast-targeting procedure be intertemporally consistent. This means that the fu-
ture policy that is assumed in the projections should coincide with the policy that
the procedure itself can be expected to recommend, as long as those aspects of future
conditions that are outside the control of the central bank turn out in the way that
is currently anticipated. While this may seem an obvious requirement, a number of
apparently sensible approaches to forecast-targeting fail to satisfy it.
112.1 Constant-Interest-Rate Projections
A popular approach in the early years of in°ation-forecast targeting | used, for
example, in the In°ation Reports of the Bank of England prior to August 2004 |
was to construct projections conditional upon a constant interest rate over the forecast
horizon (Vickers, 1998; Jansson and Vredin, 2003). The appropriate current interest-
rate decision was then taken to be the interest rate that, if expected to be maintained
over the forecast horizon, would lead to projections satisfying the target criterion (for
example, 2 percent in°ation 8 quarters in the future). This procedure had a number
of advantages. First, a bank had only to consider variations in policy over a single
dimension (alternative constant interest rates), with the consequence that a one-
dimensional target criterion would su±ce to identify the correct policy. Hence it
was enough to specify what the in°ation projection should be like some years in the
future, without having to take a stand on the trickier question of how one might choose
among alternative nearer-term transition paths. Second, contemplated changes in the
current interest-rate decision would be predicted to have non-trivial consequences,
given that any change was assumed (for purposes of the projection exercise) to be a
permanent change. And ¯nally, it was possible to construct projections without the
bank's having to tip its hand as to the likely character of future policy.
But constant-interest-rate projections raise a number of conceptual problems
(Goodhart, 2001; Leitemo, 2003; Honkapohja and Mitra, 2005; Woodford, 2005). The
assumption that the nominal interest rate will remain ¯xed at some level, regardless
of how in°ation or other variables may evolve, is not a sensible one. Moreover, in
forward-looking (rational-expectations) models of the kind that are now beginning to
be used by central banks, the assumption of a constant nominal interest rate often
implies an indeterminate price level, so that it becomes impossible to solve uniquely
for an in°ation forecast under any such interest-rate assumption.9 In models with
backward-looking expectations, the model can be solved, but such policies often im-
ply explosive in°ation dynamics. Such di±culties appears to have been a frequent
problem with the constant-interest rate projections of the Bank of England (Good-
hart, 2001), which often showed the in°ation rate passing through the target rate at
the eight-quarter horizon, but not converging to it. Figure 1 provides an example.
In such a case, it is not obvious why anyone should believe that policy is consistent
9See Woodford (2003, chap. 4) for examples of this problem.
12Figure 1: The February 2004 CPI projection under the assumption of a constant 4.0
percent interest rate. Source: Bank of England, In°ation Report, August 2004.
with the in°ation target, or expect that in°ation expectations should be anchored as
a result of a commitment to such a policy.
The most fundamental problem, however, is there will often be no reason to expect
interest rates to remain constant over the policy horizon. Indeed, constant-interest
rate projections themselves often imply that the people making the projections should
not expect the interest rate to be maintained over the forecast horizon. Consider, for
example, the in°ation projection shown in Figure 1, a constant-interest rate projection
on the basis of which the February 2004 Bank of England In°ation Report concluded
that a 4 percent policy rate was appropriate at that time.10 The ¯gure shows that
under the assumption of a constant 4 percent policy rate, consumer price in°ation
was projected (under the most likely evolution, indicated by the darkest area) to pass
10In the February Report, only the projection up to the 8-quarter horizon was shown. The ¯gure
that has been extended to a horizon 12 quarters in the future is taken from the August 2004 In°ation
Report, in which the Bank explained its reasons for abandoning the method of constant-interest-rate
projections.
13through the target rate of 2.0 percent at the eight-quarter horizon (indicated by the
vertical dashed line), and then to continue rising in the following year. Thus, if the
policy rate were to be held at 4 percent for a year, the Bank's expectation in February
2004 should have been that (under the most likely evolution, given what was known
then) in February 2005 a similar exercise would forecast consumer price in°ation to
pass through 2.0 percent at the one-year horizon, and to exceed 2.0 percent during
the second year of the projection. Hence, the Bank has essentially forecasted that
in a year's time, under the most likely evolution, the policy committee would have
reason to raise the policy rate. Thus the February 2004 projection itself could have
been taken as evidence that the Bank should not have expected the policy rate to
remain at 4 percent over the following eight quarters.
As these issues have come to be understood, a number of central banks that
formerly relied upon constant-interest-rate projections (such as the Bank of England,
since August 2004) have switched to an alternative approach. This is the construction
of projections based on market expectations of the future path of short-term interest
rates, as inferred from the term structure of interest rates and/or futures markets.
In the case that the projections constructed under this assumption satisfy the target
criterion, the correct current interest-rate decision is taken to be the one consistent
with market expectations. The use of projections based on market expectations allows
a central bank to avoid assuming a constant interest rate when there are clear reasons
to expect rates to change soon, while still not expressing any view of its own about
the likely future path of interest rates.
But the market expectations approach does not really solve the problem of internal
consistency just raised.11 One problem is that market expectations can at most supply
a single candidate forward path for policy; it is not clear what decision one is supposed
to make if that path does not lead to projections consistent with the target criterion.
Thus the procedure is incompletely speci¯ed; and if it is only the projections based
on market expectations that are published, even though the central bank has chosen
to contradict those expectations, the published projections cannot be expected to
shape private decisionmakers' forecasts of the economy's evolution.
Moreover, even if the forward path implied by market expectations does lead
to projections that ful¯ll the target criterion, the exercise is not intertemporally
11For further discussion of problems with this approach, see Woodford (2005) and Rosenberg
(2007).
14consistent if this path does not in fact correspond to the central bank's own forecast
of the likely future path of interest rates. Why should it count as a justi¯cation of a
current interest-rate decision that this would be the ¯rst step along a path that would
imply satisfaction of the target criterion, but that the central bank does not actually
expect to be followed? And why should anyone who correctly understands the central
bank's procedures base their own forecasts on published projections constructed on
such an assumption?
2.2 Choosing an Interest-Rate Path
In fact, there is no possibility of an intertemporally consistent forecast-targeting pro-
cedure that does not require the central bank to model its own likely future conduct
as part of the projection exercise. Approaches like both of those just described |
which introduce an arti¯cial assumption about the path of interest rates in order to
allow the central bank to avoid expressing any view about policy decisions that need
not yet be made | necessarily result in inconsistencies. Instead, a consistent projec-
tion exercise must make assumptions that allow the evolution of the central bank's
policy instrument to be projected, along with the projections for in°ation and other
endogenous variables. In such a case, it would be possible, but somewhat awkward,
for the central bank to remain silent about the implications of its assumptions for the
forward path of interest rates; and so it is natural to include an interest-rate projec-
tion among the projections that are discussed in the Monetary Policy Report.12 This
has been done for the past decade now by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and is
now done by the Norges Bank (since 2005) and the Riksbank (since 2007) as well.
In the case of the latter two central banks, \fan charts" (similar to the one shown in
Figure 1) are presented for the policy rate; this (among other things) makes it clear
that the path is simply a forecast, rather than a de¯nite intention that has already
been formulated, let alone a promise.
But how should future policy be speci¯ed in such an exercise? It is sometimes
12Since one is talking about projections for the paths of endogenous variables, rather than an-
nouncing an intention, there is no reason why there need be a projection for only one interest rate,
or even for the interest rate that is most emphasized to be the policy rate. Nonetheless, there are
obvious advantages in giving primarily emphasis to only a small number of key variables; and it
might seem disingenuous not to o®er a view of the path of the policy rate, given that this is most
directly under the bank's own control.
15suggested that the monetary policy committee should conceive of its task as the choice
of a path for interest rates, rather than a single number for the current operating
target, in each decision cycle. Discussions of the feasibility of such an approach have
often stressed the potential di±culty of committee voting on a decision with so many
dimensions.13 And when announcing its intention to begin publishing its own view
of the path of the policy rate, the Riksbank (Rosenberg, 2007) indicated that it
would publish \forecasts ... based on an interest-rate path chosen by the Executive
Board."14
However, the idea that one should simply ask the policy committee to decide
which forward path for interest rates they prefer, presumably after asking their sta®
to produce projections for other variables conditional on each path that is considered,
is problematic on several grounds that have nothing to do with the complexity of
the decision or the need for a committee to agree among themselves. First of all,
the speci¯cation of future policy by a simple path for a short-term nominal interest
rate, independently of how endogenous variables may develop, is never a sensible
choice, and is unlikely to lead to well-behaved results in a sensible model. (The
problems mentioned above in connection with the assumption of a constant interest-
rate path apply equally to any speci¯cation of an exogenous path; they do not result
from the assumption that the interest rate does not vary with time, but from the
assumption that it is independent of outcomes for in°ation and other variables.)
Moreover, the assumption of a speci¯c path for interest rates, una®ected by future
shocks, would seem to require one to publish a speci¯c path for this variable, alongside
the fan charts for variables such as in°ation; but this would encourage the dangerous
misunderstanding that the bank has already committed itself to follow a de¯nite path
13See, for example, Goodhart (2005) for a skeptical view; Svensson (2007) responds by proposing
a voting mechanism intended to overcome potential intransitivities in majority preferences over
alternative paths.
14It is likely, of course, that this was only a loose way of speaking in a statement intended for a
non-technical audience, and that the intention was to indicate that the Executive Board would have
to endorse the assumptions about future policy involved in generating projections of an endogenous
interest-rate path. The change in procedure does seem to have meant that the Executive Board is
now required to approve the assumptions made in the projections in a way that was not previously
true; this has made it necessary to allow for possible revisions in the projections following the
meeting at which the policy decision is made (Sveriges Riksbank, Monetary Policy Report 2007/1,
p. 21).
16long in advance.
Even supposing that these technical issues have been ¯nessed,15 there remains the
more fundamental problem of the intertemporal consistency of the procedure. Here
it is important to realize that the mere use of a consistent criterion over time to
rank alternative projected paths for the endogenous variables | not just a criterion
that provides a transitive ordering of outcomes within each decision cycle, but one
that ranks di®erent possible paths the same way, regardless of the date at which the
decision is being made | is not enough to ensure intertemporal consistency, in the
sense de¯ned above. Thus the problems of choosing a forward path for policy are
not resolved simply by asking the members of the policy committee to agree on a
loss function that they will then use (for an entire sequence of meetings) to rank
alternative possible outcomes, as proposed by Svensson (2007).
Even in the case of a single decisionmaker who minimizes a well-de¯ned loss func-
tion that remains the same over time, using a correct economic model that also
remains the same over time, and who never makes any calculation errors, the choice
of a new optimal path for policy each period will not general lead to intertemporal
consistency. For in the case of a forward-looking model of the transmission mech-
anism, the procedure will lead to the choice of a forward path for policy that one
will not be lead by the same procedure to continue in subsequent decision cycles,
even if there have been no unexpected developments in the meantime. The reason
is the same as in the celebrated argument of Kydland and Prescott (1977) for the
\time inconsistency of optimal plans": the forward path chosen at one time will take
account of the bene¯ts at earlier dates of certain expectations about policy at the
later dates, but as the later dates approach (and the earlier expectations are now
historical facts), there will no longer be a reason to take into account any e®ect of
the policy chosen for those dates on earlier expectations. This problem does not
arise solely in connection with the bias in the average rate of in°ation chosen by a
sequential optimizer, as in the example of Kydland and Prescott (1977). One may
15For example, one might specify future policy by a policy rule, such a Taylor rule, with some
number of free parameters that are optimized, in each decision cycle, so as to result in projections
that are acceptable to the monetary policy committee. If only rules that are considered that imply a
determinate equilibrium, the ¯rst problem is avoided. And since the rule that is chosen would make
the interest rate endogenous, an assumption about the distribution of shocks in each future period
would result in a probability distribution for future interest rates, just as for the future in°ation
rate.
17solve the problem of \in°ationary bias" by assigning the central bank a loss function
in which the target level of the output gap is not higher than the level consistent on
average with its in°ation target, but the optimal dynamic responses to shocks are
still not generally the ones that would be chosen under sequential (or discretionary)
optimization.16
The problem can be illustrated using the familiar discussion of optimal monetary
policy in Clarida et al. (1999). The available trade-o® between in°ation and real
activity is assumed to be characterized by a \New Keynesian Phillips curve,"
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut; (2.1)
where ¼t is the rate of in°ation between period t ¡ 1 and period t, xt is the output
gap in period t, ut is an exogenous \cost-push shock" (a stationary process with mean
zero), and · > 0;0 < ¯ < 1: The goal of policy is assumed to be the minimization of










for some relative weight ¸ > 0: Here the speci¯cation of a target value for the output
gap of zero means that the target output gap is no di®erent from the level that is
consistent with hitting the in°ation target (also zero here) on average, and as a result
there is no in°ationary bias associated with discretionary optimization.
The optimal dynamic response to a cost-push shock is nonetheless not the one
that would occur in an equilibrium17 with sequential optimization on the part of
16In the literature on in°ation targeting, it is sometimes supposed instead that there is no problem
with allowing a central bank complete discretion in its choice of the instrument settings that will
minimize its loss function, as long as the loss function involves an output-gap target that is consistent
with the in°ation target; hence in°ation targeting is argued to di®er from purely discretionary policy
only in the fact that policy is made on the basis of a loss function with this property. King (1997)
obtains a formal result to this e®ect, but in the context of a model where the aggregate-supply
relation is assumed to be of the \New Classical" form assumed by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
The result is in fact dependent on extremely special properties of that form of aggregate-supply
relation; see Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for further discussion.
17Here I mean more precisely a Markov equilibrium, in which equilibrium outcomes depend only
on state variables that a®ect either the policymaker's objective or the set of possible outcomes from
the current period onward, as is common in the literature on the suboptimality of discretionary
policy.




















Figure 2: Impulse responses to a purely transitory cost-push shock, under discre-
tionary policy (dashed lines) and under an optimal commitment (solid lines).
the central bank. The di®erence is illustrated in Figure 2, where the responses to
a purely transitory positive cost-push shock in period zero are shown in the case
of the two alternative policies.18 Because the e®ect of the shock on the location
of the in°ation/output tradeo® is not expected to last beyond period zero, under
discretionary policy (shown by the dashed line), the central bank will choose policy
that brings about zero in°ation and a zero output gap from period 1 onward. (This
minimizes the bank's objective from period 1 onward, and in the absence of any prior
commitment, it is the policy that an optimizing policy committee would choose.) In
period zero, instead, it is necessary to accept either a positive in°ation rate, a negative
output gap, or both; the optimal policy accepts some of both so as not to have losses
that are too great of either kind. The equilibrium response under an optimal policy
commitment (shown by the solid line) is instead more complex: instead of allowing
18This ¯gure reproduces Figure 7.3 from Woodford (2003), where the calculations are explained.
19the output gap to return to zero immediately following the dissipation of the shock,
it remains negative, returning to zero only gradually. The continued tight policy
results in disin°ation following the dissipation of the shock, so that the price level
returns asymptotically to the level it would have been at had the cost-push shock
never occurred. The expectation of subsequent disin°ation helps to o®set the shift
in the in°ation-output tradeo® in period zero due to the shock; as a consequence,
both less in°ation and a less negative output gap are possible during the period of
the cost-push shock.
Suppose, now, that a central bank were to choose a forward path for policy each pe-
riod, given the economy's state at that time, under the assumption that it can choose
any forward path represents a possible rational-expectations equilibrium, though it
does not commit itself to subsequently act in accordance with the paths chosen at
earlier dates. When the cost-push shock occurs, the policy committee should choose
the forward path that results in responses for in°ation and output shown by the solid
lines in Figure 2, since these responses minimize the loss function, among those paths
which, if anticipated, are consistent with the structural relation (2.1). Suppose that
in period zero the committee chooses the nominal interest rate associated with period
zero in this equilibrium; and that the same decision process is repeated in period one.
Since the e®ects of the shock have dissipated by period one, the policy committee now
judges (correctly) that it is possible to achieve an equilibrium from then on in which
¼t = xt = 0 in all periods. This is obviously the best possible equilibrium from the
standpoint of the criterion (2.2), and so this is the forward path for the policy that
will be chosen in period one and later.19 However, because the path chosen in period
one does not continue the path chosen in period zero, even if nothing unexpected
occurs between the two meetings, the procedure is not intertemporally consistent,
and the projections on the basis of which policy is chosen in period zero will not
represent good forecasts of the economy's future evolution.
Moreover, if the private sector correctly understands how policy will be conducted
under this procedure, the equilibrium outcome will not only fail to be optimal; it
19This assumes that no further shocks occur in subsequent periods. But even if there are subse-
quent shocks, since they are distributed independently of the shock that occurred in period zero,
they are equally likely to result in departures from the zero-in°ation steady state in one direction as
in the other; so the mean expected outcome from the bank's policy choices in period one and later
is one in which ¼t = xt = 0 for all t ¸ 1:
20will be even worse than the equilibrium associated with discretionary policy. In
response to a shock of the kind just considered, the private sector will expect no
e®ect on in°ation or the output gap in any future periods. Under these expectations
(which are not the ones associated with the optimal equilibrium), the best possible
outcome is the one shown by the dashed lines in Figure 2. (In that equilibrium, the
central bank optimally exploits the tradeo® that exists in period zero, given that
it recognizes that expected in°ation does not shift in response to the shock.) But
if the central bank instead supposes that it can choose any forward path for policy
that it likes (instead of recognizing that its future behavior will predictably bring
about ¼t = xt = 0 in every period), and chooses the path corresponding to the solid
lines, then it will not choose the nominal interest rate in period zero associated with
the equilibrium under discretionary policy; instead, it will raise the nominal interest
rate much less than it would under discretionary policy.20 As a result, the point on
the in°ation/output tradeo® that will actually be realized will involve more in°ation
(though a less negative output gap) than the optimal point; and as a consequence
the shock will increase the loss function (2.2) to a greater extent than it would under
discretion.
2.3 Using a Sequence of Target Criteria to Determine the
Path of Interest Rates
An alternative approach, that avoids this problem, is to determine the forward path
of policy as that path which results in projections that satisfy a sequence of quan-
titative target criteria, one for each of a sequence of future horizons. It is true that
a single criterion | say, involving the projections for 8 quarters in the future only
| can determine only a single dimension of policy, and thus can only determine an
entire path if one is constrained to consider only a one-parameter family of possible
paths (such as constant-interest-rate paths). But a sequence of similar criteria can
independently determine the stance of policy at each of a sequence of dates, and
20This follows both from the fact that it does not believe that the real interest rate needs to rise
as much as in the discretionary equilibrium | it does not seek to contract current output as much,
and it expects the return of output to the natural rate to be more gradual | and from the fact
that it expects a given nominal interest rate to correspond to a higher real interest rate than it
would in the discretionary equilibrium, because it has chosen a forward path for policy that involves
disin°ation in the following period.
21Figure 3: The in°ation and output-gap projections of the Norges Bank superimposed.
Source: Norges Bank, In°ation Report 3/2006, Chart 1.13.
thus can determine the entire forward path of policy. Moreover, if the sequence of
target criteria for di®erent horizons are of the same form | i.e., if the target crite-
rion is independent of the horizon | then the forecast-targeting procedure will be
intertemporally consistent.
As a practical example, consider the targeting procedure used by the Norges Bank
beginning in 2005. Through the end of 2006,21 each issue of the Bank's In°ation Re-
port included a box labeled \Criteria for an appropriate future interest rate path."22
According to the ¯rst of the criteria listed, \in°ation should be stabilized near the tar-
get [i.e., 2.5 percent per year] within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1-3 years,"
and moving toward that target rate even sooner. This criterion alone would sound
21Beginning with the 2007/1 issue of the Bank's Monetary Policy Report, the description of the
criterion used to select the forward path of policy has been less explicit; presumably the criterion
used at present is more complex than the simple one discussed in the text. (Note that the name of
the report was also changed with the 2007/1 issue.
22The criteria are discussed in more detail in Qvigstad (2006).
22similar to the Bank of England target criterion mentioned above, except with greater
vagueness about the horizon. But there is then a second criterion: that \the in°ation
gap [the amount by which actual in°ation exceeds the medium-run target rate] and
the output gap should be in reasonable proportion to each other until they close,"
and in particular that the two gaps \should normally not be positive or negative
at the same time."23 The second criterion indicates not only what the projections
should look like in some medium run, but also what the transition path should look
like: there should be an inverse relation between the in°ation gap and the output
gap, with the two gaps shrinking to zero together. In order to allow visual inspection
of the extent to which the projections satisfy this criterion, the Norges Bank presents
a ¯gure in which the projections for its preferred measures of in°ation24 and of the
output gap are superimposed, as shown in Figure 3. A criterion of this kind can
determine the entire forward path for policy. And with such a criterion, it is not
necessary to specify independently the rate at which the in°ation rate should be pro-
jected to approach the target rate; the appropriate rate is exactly the rate that allows
the output gap to remain in the desired proportion to the in°ation gap. (Under such
a criterion, the in°ation gap will be projected to close eventually, as long as it is not
possible to have a non-zero permanent output gap.)
The criterion just cited applies to each of a sequence of future horizons. It can be
represented formally as the requirement that
(¼t+h;t ¡ ¼
¤) + Áxt+h;t = 0 (2.3)
for each horizon h ¸ h; for some coe±cient Á > 0: Here yt+h;t denotes the projected
value at date t of some variable y, at a horizon h periods in the future; h ¸ 0 indicates
the shortest horizon at which it is still possible for policy to a®ect the projections, and
I suppose that a sequence of criteria (2.3) for h ¸ h su±ces to uniquely determine the
acceptable projections (including an implied forward path for policy).25 Suppose also
that the central bank's forecast of its own forecasts in future decision cycles satisfy
the principle that one should expect one's future forecasts to be the same as one's
23See, for example, the box on pp. 10 of Norges Bank, In°ation Report 3/2006.
24The in°ation measure emphasized by the Norges Bank in its targeting procedure, CPI-ATE, is
a consumer price index that is adjusted for tax changes and energy prices.
25See Svensson and Woodford (2005) for algebraic analysis of a speci¯c example. In the case
considered there, prices and spending decisions are each predetermined a period in advance, so that
h = 1:
23current forecasts (except, of course, as a result of developments that cannot currently
be foreseen), so that
[yt+h2;t+h1];t = yt+h2;t
for any horizons h2 ¸ h1 ¸ 0: Then if at date t a forward path for policy is chosen
that leads to projections satisfying (2.3) for each h ¸ h; it should also be projected
at that time that at any later date t+h1; the continuation of that same path should
lead to projections satisfying a corresponding sequential criterion, since at date t the
bank should project that
[(¼t+h2;t+h1 ¡ ¼
¤) + Áxt+h2;t+h1];t = 0
for all horizons h2 ¸ h1 + h: This makes the procedure of choosing a forward path
for policy on such a basis intertemporally consistent.
I believe that this kind of targeting procedure provides the most appealing solution
to the problem of intertemporal consistency. The way in which the target criterion
is used to determine an appropriate forward path for policy is essentially the same
as under the procedure used by the Bank of England prior to 2004, as discussed
above, except without either the arbitrary emphasis on a single horizon or the arbi-
trary restriction to forward paths for policy involving a constant interest rate. Since
forecast-targeting central banks already publish charts showing their projections for
each of a sequence of future horizons, rather than only presenting a set of numeri-
cal forecasts for a speci¯c horizon, discussion of a target criterion that should apply
at each horizon is fairly straightforward within the existing frameworks for deliber-
ation and communication about policy, as the example of the Norges Bank shows.
Moreover, both the Norges Bank and the Riksbank now discuss quite explicitly the
fact that their targeting procedures involve the choice of a forward path for policy,
and publish \fan charts" for the paths of short-term nominal interest rates implicit in
their projections. Hence this aspect of the recommended approach is entirely possible
within the context of existing procedures as well.
The main \practical" obstacle to such an approach, I believe, is that it would
require a central bank to adopt a highly structured approach to policy deliberations,
and to describe that approach rather explicitly to the public. It would require the
bank to be more open about its own view of the likely future evolution of policy
than even some forecast-targeting central banks have been willing to be thus far.
And it would require the bank to discuss explicitly the nature of the trade-o®s that
24determine an acceptable transition path following a disturbance, and not merely the
nature of the \medium-run" targets that one hopes to reach some years in the future.
The latter goal will almost surely require that a bank be explicit about the ways in
which projections for variables other than a single measure of in°ation are relevant to
judgments about the appropriate stance of policy. Even though all in°ation-targeting
central banks appear to care about projections for real variables as well as in°ation,26
most have been quite cautious about discussing the way in which this may factor into
their policy decisions. But this would have to be di®erent if forecast targeting were
to be adopted by an institution with a \dual mandate" like the U.S. Federal Reserve
(at least, in the absence of a substantial modi¯cation of the Federal Reserve Act by
Congress). And even in the case of other central banks, I believe that it would greatly
enhance the transparency of policymaking | and ultimately, the credibility of their
commitments to in°ation control, by making clearer the extent to which temporary
failures to return in°ation immediately to its medium-run target level are nonetheless
consistent with a systematic approach to policy that does indeed guarantee stability
of in°ation over the medium run.
3 Which Target Criterion is Appropriate?
The desirability of a forecast-targeting regime depends crucially, of course, on what
kind of target criterion is used as the focus of policy deliberations. I have mentioned
above one desideratum, which is that the target criterion su±ce to determine a unique
(or at least a unique non-explosive) rational-expectations equilibrium, and hence to
uniquely determine the forward path of policy that should be anticipated in each
decision cycle. But of course one wants, not merely to determine an equilibrium, but
to determine one with desirable properties. I have suggested above that the relative
°exibility of a forecast-targeting approach, by comparison with previous conceptions
of policy rules, should in principle allow a greater degree of success at using monetary
policy to stabilize the economy in the face of exogenous disturbances, while also
maintaining a reasonable degree of con¯dence in the future value of the currency.
26For example, the summary justi¯cation of current policy in the introduction to each issue of the
Bank of England's In°ation Report always begins by discussing the projection for real GDP growth
before turning to the in°ation projection, despite the apparent concern with the in°ation projection
alone in the simple target criterion discussed above.
25But what sort of target criterion should be adopted, in order to take best advantage
of this °exibility?
It might be feared that a commitment to pursue a speci¯c quantitative target
criterion at each future horizon, rather than allowing the policy committee to choose
the forward path associated with the most appealing projections at each point in
time without any such straightjacket, means choosing a rule that will frequently
involve undesirable responses to disturbances, simply for the sake of making policy
predictable and transparent. But a commitment to a speci¯c target criterion need
not imply any departure from an optimal stabilization policy at all; it is possible to
choose a target criterion such that ful¯llment of the criterion implements precisely the
optimal equilibrium responses to shocks. Moreover, it is possible for this to be true,
not only in the case of some particular kind of stochastic disturbance, but for any
member of a broad class of possible disturbances; this result makes the commitment
to a target criterion a particularly useful way of specifying a central bank's policy
commitment.
3.1 Example: Optimal Policy in the Basic New Keynesian
Model Revisited
Giannoni and Woodford (2002) show that it is possible quite generally to ¯nd a target
criterion that implements optimal responses to any of a broad class of disturbances,
and Giannoni and Woodford (2005) illustrate the application of this method to a
variety of models. Here I shall review only a very simple example, that illustrates
why a speci¯cation of policy in terms of a target criterion is particularly robust.
Consider again the problem of optimal stabilization policy treated by Clarida et al.
(1999). The problem of ¯nding the state-contingent evolution of in°ation and of the
output gap that minimize (2.2) subject to the constraint that (2.1) hold each period
can be solved by minimizing a Lagrangian. This results in ¯rst-order conditions of
the form
¼t + 't ¡ 't¡1 = 0 (3.1)
¸(xt ¡ x
¤) ¡ ·'t = 0 (3.2)
26each period, where 't is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (2.1) in
period t.27
Manipulation of these constraints so as to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers then




(xt ¡ xt¡1) = 0 (3.3)
should hold each period between the paths of in°ation and of the output gap. Note
that this can be interpreted as a target criterion. In fact, it is similar in form to the
criterion of the Norges Bank discussed above (and represented by equation (2.3)):
there is a constant long-run in°ation target (here, zero), short-run departures from
which are justi¯ed if they are associated with large enough projected short-run output
gaps of the right sign. (And the more negative the projected output gap in a given
period, the greater the positive in°ation gap that should be accepted in the projection
for that period. The crucial di®erence is that in (3.3) it is the change in the output
gap over a given period that is relevant for determining the in°ation that should be
accepted over that period, rather than the absolute level of the output gap as in
Figure 3.
This is not only a relation that holds each period in the optimal equilibrium,
but one that su±ces to de¯ne the optimal equilibrium dynamics. For the system of
equations consisting of (2.1) together with (3.3), if both assumed to hold each period
from some date onward, determine a unique non-explosive REE.28 Moreover, in that
equilibrium, there exists a system of Lagrange multipliers f'tg such that the ¯rst-
order conditions (3.1){(3.2) are satis¯ed each period; hence the equilibrium responses
to shocks are indeed optimal, if it can be ensured that the target criterion (3.3) is
satis¯ed each period.
More precisely, the equilibrium in which (3.3) is satis¯ed in each period t ¸ 0
is the one in which the stochastic evolution of in°ation and output minimize the
27These conditions must be satis¯ed in each period t ¸ 0, in each possible state of the world at
each date, if policy is being optimally chosen for periods t ¸ 0: In the event that there is no additional
pre-commitment of the form indicated by (3.4) below | i.e., in the conventional \Ramsey policy"
problem | there is no constraint prior to the constraint (2.1) for t = 0; and so '¡1 = 0 in the ¯rst-
order condition (3.1) for t = 0: If there is instead an initial pre-commitment of the kind discussed
below, this multiplier can be non-zero as well, and indicates the value of relaxing that constraint.
28For further discussion of this and other assertions made in this section, see Woodford (2003,
chap. 7).
27objective (2.2), among all processes consistent with the AS relation (2.1) each period,
with an initial in°ation rate
¼0 = ¹ ¼(x¡1;»0): (3.4)
Here »t is the (exogenous) state of the world in period t, and ¹ ¼(xt¡1;»t) is a function
that indicates the equilibrium in°ation rate each period in the unique non-explosive
equilibrium determined by the equations (2.1) and (3.3). Thus conformity to the
target criterion each period implements a policy that is optimal subject to an ini-
tial pre-commitment (a constraint on what policy can bring about, but that restricts
outcomes only in the initial period); this initial pre-commitment is to behave in the
same way in period zero as one will in fact wish to commit oneself to behave in the
subsequent periods.29 In the absence of any such pre-commitment, an optimal com-
mitment regarding policy from time zero onward can be characterized by ful¯llment
of a di®erent target criterion in period zero only, but ful¯llment of (3.3) from period
1 onward. Thus in either case, an optimal policy commitment can be implemented
through a commitment to a decision procedure under which (at least in every period
after the initial one) policy is chosen so as to ensure that the target criterion (3.3) is
satis¯ed, and is furthermore expected to be satis¯ed in all future periods.30
Of course, one could bring about the same equilibrium through a commitment
to use policy to bring about the in°ation rate ¹ ¼(xt¡1;»t) each period. This would
also be an example of an intertemporally consistent targeting procedure, that results
in a unique REE, which again involves responses to shocks that are optimal in the
sense just discussed. However, this way of formulating an optimal target criterion is
not robust to changes in the assumed character of the disturbances that make up the
vector »t. If one writes ¹ ¼ as a function of xt¡1 and some number of lags of ut; for
example, then the optimal dependence of the function on the various lags of ut will
29Policy that is optimal subject to a self-consistent initial pre-commitment of this kind is called
\optimal from a timeless perspective" in Giannoni and Woodford (2002); see also Woodford (2003,
chap. 7).
30It is of course the fact that Ramsey optimal policy involves a di®erent target criterion in the
initial period that accounts for the fact that choosing a forward path for policy in each decision cycle
so as to minimize the loss function (2.2) does not lead to the same policy choices as the choice of a
forward path that is expected to satisfy (3.3) at each horizon | so that the former procedure is not
intertemporally consistent. Under sequential re-optimization, the current period is always treated
as \the initial period", resulting in a failure to choose to continue the path of policy chosen in the
previous decision cycle.
28depend on the autoregressive dynamics of the process futg: The target criterion (3.3)
instead implements the optimal responses to disturbances regardless of the assumed
properties of the disturbances; note that we did not need to make any assumption
about the process futg in order to derive the criterion (3.3), though we did need
to make a very speci¯c assumption (namely, that ut is an i.i.d. random variable)
in order to derive the dynamic response coe±cients shown in Figure 2. The target
criterion (3.3) also has the advantage that it can be explained to the public without
having to make any reference to particular types of structural disturbances; instead,
the target criterion only involves \target variables," i.e., variables that are relevant
to the central bank's stabilization objectives.
3.2 Robustness of the Optimal Target Criterion
The above example relates, of course, to a single very simple model | one that is
obviously too simple to provide the basis for policy deliberations in an actual central
bank. Nonetheless, the possibility of implementing optimal responses to disturbances
using a target criterion is not a special feature of this example. In fact, Giannoni
and Woodford (2002) show that an optimal target criterion can be derived for any
stabilization policy problem belonging to a fairly general family of linear-quadratic
problems.31 In any such case, the target criterion is a linear relationship among the
various target variables (arguments of the quadratic loss function) such that there is
a unique non-explosive REE consistent with satisfaction of the target criterion at all
times; and this REE always implements the responses to disturbances associated with
an optimal ex ante commitment, regardless of the statistical properties of the distur-
bances (as long as these are purely additive terms in the model's linear structural
relations).
Hence it is possible for any central bank that is willing to base its policy on a
particular quantitative model of the transmission mechanism to derive an appropriate
target criterion. (The best target criterion, of course, might be di®erent for di®erent
economies.) Nor is there any need for the bank to reconsider its commitment to the
target criterion each time a shock of some unusual type occurs. Since novel types
31One can furthermore ¯nd a linear target criterion such that the equilibrium determined by the
criterion agrees with the optimal equilibrium responses, to a linear approximation, in the case of a
fairly general class of su±ciently di®erentiable policy problems.
29of disturbances will occur relatively frequently (in fact, no two disturbances are ever
of exactly the same type), while structural change in the economy (or a substantial
change in a central bank's understanding of the structure of the economy) occurs
much less often, a target criterion that is equally suitable regardless of the nature of
the disturbance is one to which a central bank should be able to provisionally commit
itself, even if from time to time it would still be appropriate to reconsider the target
criterion in the light of new knowledge or new circumstances.32
But while a fully optimal target criterion of this type exists in principle, it is likely
to be too complicated to be useful as the basis for communication with the public,
in the case of any model with even a modest claim to empirical realism.33 The fully
optimal criterion is also likely to depend on the precise parameterization of a number
of ¯ne details of one's model of the economy | parameter values (or even model
features) about which there will in fact be considerable uncertainty. As a practical
matter, what one should really be interested in is a fairly simple target criterion that
provides a reasonable approximation to optimal policy, even if it is not fully optimal;
and one that continues to lead to an equilibrium that is not too far from optimal,
even if the true model of the economy is slightly di®erent from the one for which the
rule was designed.
What we need, then, is a study of economic performance under alternative quan-
titative target criteria in the spirit of the Taylor program | one should study alter-
native target criteria in precisely the same way that alternative interest-rate feedback
rules have been studied over the past ¯fteen years. This means that one should not
only address the level of welfare associated with alternative parameterizations in the
context of a single model, but also investigate the degree to which a given quantitative
target criterion may be robust, in the sense of achieving relatively good performance
32In principle, frequent reconsideration of the target criterion is possible, without this eliminating
the advantages of policy commitment, if the central bank always chooses a new policy rule that
is \optimal from a timeless perspective," rather than one that seeks to exploit already existing
expectations at the time of the policy change. But in practice, public understanding of the systematic
character of policy, and veri¯ability of the bank's adherence to its alleged commitments, will be better
served if reconsiderations of the target criterion do not occur every year.
33The complexity of the optimal target criterion derived by Giannoni and Woodford (2005) for a
small empirical model of the U.S. economy | a four-equation model that is still extremely simple
relative to the models used for policy analysis in most central banks | illustrates this point. While
it is possible to give a precise statement of the optimal target criterion, I shall not attempt it here!
30across a range of model speci¯cations. In fact, the methods required to do this are
exactly the same ones that have already been employed in the study of interest-rate
rules; one simply uses the equation that states the target criterion (i.e., an equa-
tion such as (3.3) as the \missing equation" that speci¯es monetary policy, rather
than adding an interest-rate equation (such as the Taylor rule) to one's stochastic
simulation model.
Relatively little work of this kind has already been undertaken, so I cannot survey
its conclusions. But there are good reasons to suppose that relatively robust target
criteria can be found. A number of results that can be obtained from the study of
optimal target criteria in relatively simple examples suggest that the description of
desirable policy in terms of a target criterion is likely to be more robust than other
ways of characterizing the same policy.
First of all, there is the fact that it is possible to state a target criterion that
describes optimal policy (and that su±ces to determine the optimal equilibrium | the
description of optimal policy is not robust at the cost of being incomplete), regardless
of the statistical properties of the disturbances to which the central bank may need
to respond. This does not mean that the central bank does not need to determine
the speci¯c properties of the disturbances that have just occurred; determining what
adjustment of its interest-rate operating target is required in order to conform to the
target criterion will require an assessment of the nature of current shocks. But the
target criterion that is to be achieved can be stated more generally. A description of
the optimal policy at the level of an appropriate interest-rate reaction function is not
similarly robust.
Second, certain kinds of structural change will not require any change in the
appropriate target criterion. In the policy problem discussed above, a change in the
equations of the structural model that determine how interest rates a®ect spending
will not have any e®ect on the above derivation if it does not change either the
aggregate-supply relation (2.1) or the appropriate stabilization objective (2.2); and
so (3.3) would continue to be the optimal target criterion. Again, this does not mean
that structural change of this sort can be ignored by the central bank; it will have
to be taken account of if the bank's interest-rate decisions are to have the desired
e®ect. But it would remain possible to organize policy deliberations around the goal
of satisfying an unchanged quantitative target criterion. (Again, a description of
optimal policy at the level of an interest-rate reaction function would not be similarly
31invariant.)
But perhaps more surprisingly, even types of structural change that do change
the quantitative speci¯cation of the aggregate-supply relation do not always require
a change in the quantitative speci¯cation of the target criterion, in order for policy to
continue to be optimal. This is because the appropriate loss function (in terms of the
paths of prices and output), in order for the central bank's stabilization objective to
correspond to household welfare maximization, also changes in the case of a change in
those aspects of economic structure that determine available tradeo® between output
and in°ation, indicated by the aggregate-supply relation. In fact, there is a whole
range of changes that would imply a di®erent quantitative speci¯cation of aggregate
supply, but that do not change the optimal target criterion, because the changes in
the aggregate-supply relation and in the welfare-based loss function precisely cancel
one another.
The aggregate-supply relation (2.1) assumed by Clarida et al. (1999) represents a
log-linear approximation to the relation implied by a particular model of price-setting,
namely a model in which price changes are staggered in the way proposed by Calvo
(1983). The loss function (2.2) is an appropriate objective in the case of this model,
as it can be shown to be (inversely related to) a quadratic approximation to the
expected utility of the representative household in the DSGE model. In the case that
we assume an e±cient steady-state level of output,34 the value of ¸ corresponding to





where µ is the elasticity of substitution among alternative di®erentiated goods (and
hence the elasticity of demand faced by each monopolistically competitive producer).
Hence the optimal target criterion (3.3) can alternatively be written
¼t + µ
¡1(xt ¡ xt¡1) = 0: (3.6)
34This assumption simpli¯es the analysis of the welfare-based loss function, because it is not
necessary to consider the e®ects of stabilization policy on the average level of output in order to
obtain a welfare measure that is accurate to second order, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap.
6). All of the results reviewed in this section are derived under that simpli¯cation. However, a
welfare-based quadratic loss function can also be derived without this assumption, using the method
illustrated in Benigno and Woodford (2005). For example, in the Calvo model the welfare-based
loss function is of the form (2.2) even without the assumption of an e±cient steady-state, but the
correct value of ¸ is in general more complicated than the simple formula (3.5).
32Note that the quantitative speci¯cation of the optimal target criterion turns out
to depend on only one underlying structural parameter of the model: the value of
µ. (This parameter is important because it determines the extent to which the dis-
persion of prices that results from variability of the in°ation rate causes ine±cient
non-uniformity in the composition of the national product.) A variety of other pa-
rameters | parameters describing household preferences, the production technology,
and the frequency of adjustment of prices | all a®ect the slope of the aggregate-
supply curve, but have no e®ect on the quantitative speci¯cation of the optimal
target criterion (3.6). Thus the optimal target criterion is not only more robust than
a representation of optimal policy in terms of a reaction function, it is also a more
robust speci¯cation of the appropriate goal of policy than the loss function (2.2).
This is a further reason why it is more desirable for a central bank to commit itself
to a speci¯c target criterion than for it to publicly specify its loss function.
Other, even more substantial modi¯cations of the model are also possible, without
a®ecting the optimality of the target criterion (3.6). The basic new Keynesian model
considered by Clarida et al. assumes that the utility of the representative house-
hold is additively separable over time, but empirical models often ¯nd that the data
are better explained by preferences that incorporate habit persistence, and Giannoni
and Woodford (2005) consider the consequences for optimal monetary policy of this
generalization. The most important consequence of habit persistence, of course, is a
change in the relation between real interest rates and the dynamics of expenditure;
but this in itself is no reason for a change in the optimal target criterion, though
it certainly a®ects the interest-rate path required by the target criterion. However,
habit persistence also changes the relation between current output (or expenditure)
and the marginal utility of income; as a consequence, the way that output enters both
the aggregate-supply relation and the welfare-based loss function must change. Yet
the two changes cancel one another in their e®ects on the optimal target criterion,
for Giannoni and Woodford show that (3.6) continues to characterize optimal policy,
regardless of the degree of habit persistence. Once again, the optimal target crite-
rion is more robust to changes in the economic structure than is the welfare-based
quadratic loss function.
All of the examples discussed thus far assume price stickiness of the form intro-
duced by Calvo (1983). But the \new Keynesian Phillips curve" (2.1) is often crit-
icized for its implication that in°ation determination is purely forward-looking, and
33empirical models often incorporate some degree of structural in°ation inertia. One
way to motivate such inertia is to assume (contrary to the simple Calvo speci¯cation)
that the probability of revision of a given ¯rm's price is an increasing (rather than
constant) function of the time since the price was set; this results in a generalization
of (2.1) in which lagged in°ation rates appear as determinants of current in°ation,
along with expectations of future in°ation, as in common (\hybrid NKPC") empir-
ical speci¯cations. But as shown by Sheedy (2005), the appropriate welfare-based
loss function changes as well, since the relation between the dynamics of aggregate
in°ation and the degree of cross-sectional dispersion of prices at a given point in time
changes; and optimal policy continues to be characterized by the target criterion
(3.6), regardless of the values of the parameters that determine the hazard rate for
price changes as a function of price duration.
An alternative interpretation of apparent in°ation inertia is provided by the
\sticky information" model of Mankiw and Reis (2002). In this model, each ¯rm
charges at all times the price that it expects at that time to maximize its current
pro¯ts, but ¯rms do not continuously update their information about market condi-
tions; in°ation inertia thus results from inertia in the average estimate of the current
in°ation rate. This kind of model leads to a very di®erent kind of aggregate-supply
relation, but again Ball et al. (2005) show that optimal policy is characterized by a
target criterion of the form (3.6).35 More precisely, optimal policy requires that the
quantity on the left-hand side of (3.6) must be a deterministic sequence, that can be
perfectly forecasted arbitrarily far in advance; it need not be zero (or even constant),
since in this model there are no real e®ects of changes in the general price level that
are expected by all ¯rms, no matter how long it has been since they last updated
their information. But a rule of the form (3.6) would be one example of an optimal
policy rule in this model, and since this particular rule is also optimal in the case
of sticky-price models, it is therefore a more robust policy choice than would result
from some other deterministic sequence.
I do not mean to suggest that (3.6) should be an optimal target criterion, regard-
less of the structure of the economy; it is easy to give examples where the optimal
target criterion is not of this form (see, e.g., Giannoni and Woodford, 2005). All of
the examples just reviewed have important elements in common | for example, they
35Note that (3.6) implies that logPt + µ
¡1xt is equal to a constant, which is how Ball et al.
describe the optimal policy.
34are all models in which only prices are sticky (not wages), and they are all models
that are perfectly symmetric across sectors (di®erent sectors have identical produc-
tion technologies, the same kind and degree of nominal rigidities or informational
frictions, etc.) | and I do not mean to suggest that these idealizations are adequate
for practical monetary policy analysis. But these examples do indicate that even the
optimal target criterion need not depend on all aspects of the model speci¯cation;
this gives one reason to hope that it may be possible to ¯nd target criteria that are
fairly robust across (even if not fully independent of) aspects of the model speci¯ca-
tion about which policymakers remain uncertain. In particular, they suggest that a
description of desirable policy in terms of a target criterion may be more robust to
model uncertainty than other descriptions that would be equally valid in the absence
of such uncertainty.
4 Implementing the Target Criterion
Thus far, I have spoken about the choice of a target criterion as if one can take it for
granted that there is a policy under which the target criterion will in fact be satis¯ed
each period, and that selecting a target criterion means committing oneself to a
decision procedure that implements that policy. (I have pointed out that one must
ask whether there exists any equilibrium consistent with a given target criterion; but
if there does, I have not treated the achievement of that equilibrium as problematic.)
But this is hardly obvious; and a discussion of the practicality of forecast targeting
as a monetary policy strategy would be incomplete without any consideration of how
one should determine the actual actions to be taken by the central bank under such
a strategy. Certainly one cannot compare a forecast targeting strategy to a \lower-
level" speci¯cation of a policy rule, such as the Taylor rule, without also describing
what forecast targeting means for the way in which the policy instrument should be
adjusted over time.
I have mentioned above that, in the case that the target criterion is one that
implies a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium, it therefore implies a par-
ticular state-contingent evolution of the policy rate. But that does not mean that
there are no further issues to address with regard to the policy actions that should
be chosen in order to implement the target criterion. For even when a particular
rule for setting the central bank's operating target for the policy rate is known to
35be consistent with the rational-expectations equilibrium that the target criterion is
intended to bring about, that need not mean that this equilibrium is the only one
that is consistent with that rule. Thus we again face a question about whether a par-
ticular rule determines a unique rational-expectations equilibrium, distinct from the
one discussed above | and one that the theorem of Giannoni and Woodford (2002)
does not address. Even if there is only one stationary REE under which the target
criterion is satis¯ed at all times, it does not follow that a reaction function that is
consistent with ful¯llment of the target criterion | because it is consistent with that
REE | is not also consistent with other REE; because it may also be consistent with
equilibria in which the target criterion is not ful¯lled.
Even if this is not a problem, one has only veri¯ed that the rule for setting
interest rates should have the desired consequences under the assumptions that (i)
the economy will indeed reach a rational-expectations equilibrium, and (ii) the central
bank's structural model is correct. It remains important to ask how robust the policy
is to possible departures from these ideal cases. These are issues that have been
extensively addressed in the literature on simple Taylor-type rules, but they need also
to be addressed for interest-rate reaction functions that are intended to implement a
target criterion. Here again, the issues are ones that can (and should) be addressed
at each of two levels, in the case of a forecast-targeting strategy: one should ask, ¯rst,
whether ful¯llment of the target criterion will still lead to a fairly desirable outcome,
in the case of a certain departure from rational expectations (for example); but then
one should also ask whether the interest-rate rule intended to implement the target
criterion still comes close to ful¯lling the target criterion, in the case of the departure
from rational expectations. A similar question about robustness can be posed at each
of the two levels, for any of a variety of types of model mis-speci¯cation with which
one might be concerned.
Once one concedes this, it might be asked whether there is any advantage to for-
mulations of policy commitments in terms of a target criterion at all. If one still needs
to address the questions of determinacy, learnability of the rational-expectations equi-
librium, and robustness to model uncertainty all over again at the level of the spec-
i¯cation of an interest-rate reaction function, even when the target criterion (if it
could be assumed to be necessarily satis¯ed) has been shown to be desirable on all
of those grounds, why not simply search for desirable interest-rate rules without the
discussion of desirable target criteria at all? The answer is that I believe that there
36will turn out to be advantages of a rule for the adjustment of interest rates that
explicitly uses a target criterion in determining what the interest rate should be |
that is, of a forecast-targeting procedure | over other interest-rate rules that might
happen to support an equilibrium in which the target criterion is satis¯ed. (In the
latter case, one would be justi¯ed in simply saying that the rule is good because
it implements a desirable equilibrium, without any need to discuss the target crite-
rion.) And the advantages that I believe such rules are likely to have are precisely
the ability to exclude undesired alternative equilibria, the ability to facilitate the
convergence of out-of-equilibrium expectations to the REE, and greater robustness of
alternative model speci¯cations. However, these advantages depend on a particular
understanding of what it means to use the target criterion to determine the appro-
priate interest-rate operating target; in particular, it is necessary for the central bank
to monitor private-sector expectations, and to respond to them in a particular way.
4.1 The Example Once Again
This can be illustrated using the analysis in Preston (2004) of alternative approaches
to implementation of the optimal target criterion (3.3) in the basic new-Keynesian
model. Preston shows that under arbitrary (subjective) private-sector expectations,
the aggregate-supply relation takes the form












where the notation is the same as in (2.1) above, but now the operator ^ Et[¢] indicates
the conditional expectation under the (common) probability beliefs of private agents
at date t, which may or may not correspond to the true conditional expectation (i.e.,
\rational expectations"). This in°ation equation results from log-linearization of the
optimal price-setting rule for ¯rms in a model with monopolistic competition and
Calvo staggering of price changes; 0 < ® < 1 is the probability that any ¯rm's price
will not be revised in a given period. Note that under the assumption of rational
expectations | so that subjective forecasts of future in°ation are consistent with
in°ation's being determined by this equation in all future periods | this equation
implies the relation (2.1) used by Clarida et al. (1999); but more generally, subjective
forecasts of both in°ation and output for more than one period in the future a®ect
the location of the current in°ation/output tradeo®.
37In order to determine the interest rate required in order to implement the target
criterion, one must adjoin an equilibrium relation between interest rates and private
expenditure. Preston shows that under arbitrary private-sector expectations, the
\intertemporal IS relation" of the standard new-Keynesian model takes the form
xt = ¡¾(it ¡ r
n










t indicates exogenous variation in the Wicksellian \natural rate of interest".36
This is essentially a permanent-income model of expenditure by the representative
household, augmented to take account of the e®ects of the anticipated path of real
interest rates on the optimal timing of expenditure; again, under the assumption of
rational expectations, it would reduce to the simpler relation (involving only expec-
tations of variables one period in the future) used by Clarida et al. (1999).
We may now compare two of the approaches to implementation of the target
criterion discussed by Preston. One approach would be to compute the REE implied
by satisfaction of the target criterion (discussed in section 3), and determine the
state-contingent path of nominal interest rates in that equilibrium. In the case of the
target criterion (3.3) and structural relations (4.1){(4.2), this leads to a solution of
the form
it = ¹ {(xt¡1;st) (4.3)
for the interest rate, where st is the economy's (exogenous) state in period t (in gen-
eral, a vector), including a full description of all information in period t about the
current and future values of the disturbances fuT;rn
Tg.37 One approach to implemen-
tation would be to compute this solution, and then use (4.3) to determine the central
bank's operating target it each period, after observing the current state st: Note that
36This is a function of exogenous disturbances, such as the rate of time preference and the state of
technology, that indicates what the short-run real interest rate would be each period in an equilibrium
where a zero output gap is maintained at all times. For further discussion of the natural rate of
interest, and of the microfoundations of this model, see Woodford (2003, chap. 4).
37Note that in the three relations (3.3), (4.1), and (4.2) that we solve to determine the REE
evolution of the endogenous variables, the only lagged endogenous variable that appears is xt¡1;
appearing in (3.3). This ensures that if there is a determinate equilibrium, it must be described by
a function of the form (4.3). Note also that the precise form of the function ¹ {(x;s) depends on the
speci¯cation of the joint stochastic process for the exogenous disturbances, and not simply on the
coe±cients of the three relations just listed.
38under this approach, the target criterion would not actually be used in the routine
conduct of policy; it would only be used (once) to compute the function (4.3). More-
over, the target criterion is not really needed even in that calculation; equation (4.3)
is simply a (partial) description of the optimal equilibrium, and so it is really only
computation of the optimal equilibrium that is required under this approach. Thus
this approach would not really deserve to be called a \forecast targeting" procedure,
even if it is a policy consistent with satisfaction of the target criterion.
But this approach to implementation of optimal policy has undesirable proper-
ties. For many possible values of the parameters, rational-expectations equilibrium
is indeterminate under commitment to an interest-rate rule of the form (4.3).38 The
reason, essentially, is that such a policy would not conform to the \Taylor Principle"
that interest rates should be raised in response to in°ation above the target rate,
and sharply enough to make the real interest rate an increasing function of in°ation.
While the rule (4.3) is consistent with the desired equilibrium, policy under this rule
is too \passive" to ensure that this is the only possible REE.39 Moreover, a \passive"
rule of this kind is also ine®ective in steering expectations closer to the REE in the
case that people initially have other beliefs, but update their forecasting rules on the
basis of the data that they observe.40 Preston (2004) analyzes learning dynamics in
this model, under the assumption that people forecast future in°ation, output and
interest rates as linear functions of the exogenous state and the lagged output gap,
and that the coe±cients of their forecasting rules are determined by OLS regressions,
constantly updated as additional data are observed. He shows that often a rule of the
form (4.3) implies unstable learning dynamics, that will diverge from rational expec-
tations with probability 1 even if people happen to start with forecasting rules close
to rational expectations. There is also considerable reason to doubt the robustness
of this kind of rule under model mis-speci¯cation, even if one is not troubled by the
above results (perhaps because one presumes that the economy will necessarily settle
38See the analysis in Svensson and Woodford (2005). Svensson and Woodford discuss a more
elaborate version of the model, in which both pricing and spending decisions are predetermined, but
the conditions on parameter values that control the determinacy of equilibrium are identical in the
case discussed here.
39On the role of the \Taylor Principle" for the determinacy of equilibrium under certain simple
families of interest-rate rules, see e.g., Clarida et al. (2000), Woodford (2003, chap. 4).
40The essential intuition that a passive interest-rate policy will fail to stabilize in°ation expecta-
tions if these extrapolate observed past in°ation is contained in an argument of Friedman (1968).
39into the \minimum-state-variable" REE associated with a given policy rule, through
a process that need not be explained). For example, the coe±cients on the state
variables in (4.3) will depend on the degree of persistence of the disturbances, so that
the rule will not continue to achieve the optimal equilibrium if this has been wrongly
speci¯ed, even though the target criterion (3.3) would continue to characterize the
optimal equilibrium in this case.
Another approach is to use the structural relations (presumed to be correctly un-
derstood by the central bank) to determine the interest-rate operating target required
in order to ensure that realized in°ation and output satisfy the target criterion (3.3),
given the expectations that people actually have, whether these correspond to the ex-
pectations that would be \rational" under this policy or not. This approach requires
that the central bank monitor the expectations of market participants, in order to
adjust interest rates in a way that o®sets the e®ects of any departures of people's
actual expectations from rational expectations. In order to specify concretely what
this involves, Preston assumes that the private sector's period-t forecasts ( ^ Et¼T, etc.)
are determined prior to the central bank's decision about its period-t operating target
it,41 though they may depend on the exogenous state st, and that they are observed
by the central bank (along with the exogenous state) prior to its choice of it: Given
this information, the central bank can use (4.1) together with (3.3) to determine the
values of ¼t and xt that it should seek to bring about, in order for the target criterion
















T¡t[·xT + (1 ¡ ®=®)¼T + uT]: (4.4)
It can then use (4.2) to determine the interest rate it that should achieve this target
41Note that this need not be the case, though it is a property of the particular kind of learning
process that Preston speci¯es. While the assumption is a restrictive one, it does not rule out the
possibility of rational expectations, since in the REE, the central bank's choice of it will be a perfectly
predictable function of variables that have already been determined at the time that people form
their period-t forecasts.















where ^ xt is de¯ned in (4.4). Equation (4.5) represents an alternative interest-rate rule
that, like (4.3), is consistent with the REE determined by the target criterion. But
it describes a policy in which the target criterion plays a crucial role in the conduct
of policy; indeed, while it is possible to describe the policy using the interest-rate
rule, it is much more compactly described by the prescription to use one's model of
the economy, together with one's estimates of current fundamentals and the current
state of private-sector expectations, to determine the interest rate needed in order to
ensure that the target criterion (3.3) is satis¯ed.
While (4.3) might seem to represent a simpler approach to policy | both one that
is simpler to execute and one that makes outside veri¯cation of the central bank's
compliance with the rule simpler | the rule (4.5) is a more reliable way of bring-
ing about the desired outcome. First of all, there is necessarily a unique stationary
REE consistent with rule (4.5).42 For regardless of what the private sector may be
expecting, (4.5) implies that xt = ^ xt and hence that ¼t and xt satisfy (3.3). As this
will be true each period, if the private sector has rational expectations, they must be
expecting (and their actions will generate) the unique REE consistent with the target
criterion. Moreover, Preston (2004) shows that if instead private-sector expectations
evolve through least-squares learning, in the case of rule (4.5) the learning dynamics
converge to the REE.43 This is because this rule involves responses to variations in
private-sector expectations that neutralize the e®ects of the errant expectations on ag-
gregate outcomes, thus short-circuiting the process through which out-of-equilibrium
expectations might become self-ful¯lling. Finally, while this has been less thoroughly
42Thus there is a value to a commitment to respond to potential departures from rational expec-
tations, even if one is con¯dent that the economy must end up in a REE; for responding in this
way ensures that there are not other REE besides the one in which the target criterion is always
satis¯ed.
43More precisely, Preston shows that the REE is \E-stable" in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). This implies convergence to the REE in expectation, and convergence with probability 1 in
the case that certain bounds are imposed on how far people's forecasting rules can depart from the
REE rules.
41studied, it is likely that performance under rule (4.5) is more robust to variations
in the model speci¯cation. For example, rule (4.5) implements the optimal dynamic
responses to disturbances regardless of the degree of persistence of the disturbances,
unlike the rule (4.3). (Note that no assumptions about the disturbance processes
have been used in deriving (4.5). It would be desirable to study the robustness of a
rule like this to other forms of model misspeci¯cation, as has often been done in the
case of simple Taylor rules. As discussed in section 3, it is known that for a variety
of alternative models of price adjustment, (3.3) continues to be an optimal target
criterion. Hence the prescription \act so as to ensure that (3.3) holds" is a robust
policy, within this set of alternative models, even if the more speci¯c formula (4.5),
which depends on the structural relations (4.1){(4.2), will not be equally robust.
4.2 Comparison with the Taylor Rule
To what extent is an analysis of the kind proposed here | the search for a robust
approach to implementation of a robust target criterion | likely to lead to recommen-
dations for policy that di®er from those obtained from the Taylor research program,
namely, the search for a simple interest-rate reaction function with robust properties?
I suspect that many of the most important conclusions from Taylor's research will
also be supported by an inquiry of this kind. That is to say, a desirable forecast-
targeting framework will involve a conduct of policy that conforms to many of the
broad guidelines for sound policy emphasized by Taylor.44
This is illustrated by the presentation above of an optimal targeting procedure in
the context of the basic new-Keynesian model. The interest-rate reaction function
(4.5) that implements the optimal target criterion shares a number of features with
the simple rule advocated by Taylor (1993). In fact, it could be called a sort of
\forward-looking Taylor rule," insofar as the prescribed short-term interest rate it is
an increasing function of expected future in°ation, expected future output gaps, and
the current and expected future levels of the natural rate of interest. One respect
in which (4.5) di®ers from more familiar examples of forward-looking Taylor rules
is that it also involves forecasts of future interest rates. Because it is the expected
44The observed conduct of actual forecast-targeting central banks has often been found to look
fairly similar to the policy that would follow from a Taylor rule. For example, Nelson (2003) ¯nds
that UK policy has been much more similar to the kind prescribed by Taylor (1993) after the
introduction of in°ation-forecast targeting in 1992 than was true in earlier periods.
42path of interest rates that determines aggregate demand, rather than the current
short rate alone, higher future short rates can substitute for a higher short rate now;
so the required current short rate is a decreasing function of expected future short
rates, given expectations regarding in°ation, the output gap, and the natural rate of
interest.
Moreover, this reaction function conforms to the \Taylor principle", insofar as an
average of current and expected future nominal interest rates is speci¯ed to be an
increasing function of an average of expected future in°ation rates (for given expec-
tations regarding the output gap and the natural rate), with a response coe±cient
that is greater than one. We can alternatively write (4.5) in the form
^ Et¹ {t = Á¼ ^ Et¹ {t+1 + :::;
where¹ {t is a weighted average of the interest rates iT in periods T ¸ t; ¹ ¼t is a weighted
average of the in°ation rates ¼T in periods T ¸ t; and the omitted terms involve (both
actual and expected values of) the output gap and the exogenous disturbances. When
the rule is expressed in this way,
Á¼ = 1 +
·¾¡1
·2 + ¸
¯(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ ®¯
> 1;
in accordance with the Taylor Principle. This aspect of the reaction function is
probably not unrelated to its success in eliminating instability due to self-ful¯lling
expectations.
Nonetheless, while this policy is similar to the policy prescribed by the Taylor rule
in certain important respects, it does not follow that a central bank would therefore
be best advised to simply try to follow the Taylor rule, or to explain its decisions to
the public in those terms. There is an alternative, fairly simple description of the
policy prescription represented by (4.5) that is also more precise: it is a prescription
to set interest rates as required in order for in°ation and output to satisfy the target
criterion (3.3).
Moreover, this alternative prescription is more sophisticated in important respects.
If the basic new-Keynesian model were correct, and the economy were to follow the
REE associated with the policy, it would lead to optimal dynamic responses to all
disturbances. Even more generally, some of the ways in which it di®ers from the
simple Taylor rule are likely to be desirable. For example, (4.5) prescribes that the
43interest rate should be an increasing function of expectations of the future output
gap relative to its recent past level, rather than the absolute level of the gap as in
the simple Taylor rule. A rule of this kind will be less vulnerable to the possibility
that a persistent error in estimating the natural rate of output can lead to persistent
in°ation above the central bank's long-run target.45 Because it is much easier to
imagine a substantial, persistent error in a central bank's estimate of the level of the
natural rate than in its estimate of the growth rate, a rule that depends only on the
projected change in the output gap is likely to be much more robust to possible errors
of this kind.46
The targeting procedure also di®ers from the simple Taylor rule in the way that
it requires the central bank to respond to measures of private-sector expectations.
Under the simple Taylor rule, private-sector expectations can be ignored; one trusts
that a rule with desirable stabilization properties will stabilize expectations as well.
The targeting procedure instead directs the central bank to respond to variations in
private-sector expectations, so as to o®set their projected e®ects on the particular
combination of in°ation and output growth that constitutes the target criterion.
To the extent that su±cient information about expectations exists to allow such a
response, such a response should tend to stabilize the economy regardless of the
vagaries of expectations | and should therefore stabilize expectations themselves
more reliably as well.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that forecast-targeting procedures provide a useful way of implement-
ing a rule-based approach to the conduct of monetary policy, and that the normative
study of monetary policy rules would do well to pay more attention to proposed rules
45Orphanides (2003) warns that this may be a serious risk under a Taylor rule that involves the
absolute level of the output gap. He shows that US policy in the 1970s was fairly consistent with a
forward-looking Taylor rule of the same kind as also describes US policy in the Greenspan period,
if one assumes that the FOMC responded to estimates of the output gap that were available at the
time; in this interpretation, the policy led to a decade of in°ation as a result of a failure to recognize
the slowdown in trend productivity growth.
46Orphanides (2003) shows that real-time errors in estimates of the quarter-to-quarter change in
the output gap were quite modest during the 1970s, if one assumes that Fed's estimates by the 1990s
were roughly correct.
44of this type. This would involve analysis of two distinct, though obviously comple-
mentary issues: on the one hand, the desirability of satisfying a given target criterion
(speci¯ed as a relation among endogenous \target variables"), on the assumption that
this can be arranged; and on the other hand, the e±cacy of alternative procedures for
adjusting the instrument of policy as ways of ensuring that the target criterion should
be satis¯ed. In the case of each of these issues, it is important not only to analyze
the question for a given model speci¯cation that is assumed to be precisely correct,
and under the assumption that the state variables referred to in the model are pre-
cisely observable by the central bank, but also to consider the robustness of a given
prescription to possible errors in either the model speci¯cation or in the evaluation
of current conditions.
Forecast-targeting procedures are especially desirable classes of policy rules for two
reasons. On the one hand, this way of specifying a rule of conduct seems especially
likely to provide a useful basis for explaining the systematic character of policy to the
public, while at the same time allowing policy to respond to respond in a °exible way
to unexpected developments, including changes in the central bank's understanding
of the character of disturbances and of the structure of the economy. And at the same
time, it is a form of rule-based policy that is fairly close to the kind of procedures
already being adopted by a number of central banks; hence it is a kind of policy rule
that, if found to have desirable properties in theory, it is particularly plausible for
central banks to consider. Further study of forecast-targeting procedures would thus
serve the laudable goal, that has animated much of the research program of John
Taylor, of providing a \translation" of the conclusions of normative economic theory
into terms that can guide actual policy decisions.
While more work on rules of this class is needed, some provisional conclusions are
already possible that may allow improvement upon the current practices of forecast-
targeting central banks. The projections that are central to forecast targeting should
be based on intertemporally consistent assumptions about future monetary policy.
The most practical way to do this is to seek to determine an endogenous path for
future policy that ensures the satisfaction of a particular target criterion at each of
an entire sequence of future horizons, rather than some single horizon. Furthermore,
the target criterion must apply to relatively near horizons and not only to outcomes
several years in the future. It is important to specify not merely the in°ation rate
that should be expected in the \medium run" (though it is crucial that a central bank
45be clear about that particular implication of the targeting procedure), but also the
nature of an acceptable transition path by which an economy currently away from
the medium-run target in°ation rate is expected to approach it. This in turn will
inevitably require that a central bank be more explicit than most forecast-targeting
central banks have thus far been about the way in which projections for variables other
than a single overall measure of in°ation are taken into account in the policy decision.
Finally, a robust approach to the implementation of the target criterion requires that
the central bank monitor private-sector expectations (through the variety of direct
and indirect sources of information about expectations that is available to it), with
a view to correcting the e®ects on the macroeconomy of departures from the beliefs
that the bank itself would regard as correct.
No central bank currently conforms very fully to all of these precepts, and so I
believe that there is ample room for further productive dialogue between students of
the theory of monetary policy and its practitioners. But forecast targeting as it has
developed over the past ¯fteen years already represents an important step toward
more systematic and more transparent policy. This is highly desirable, for reasons
that monetary theory has made clear, and the further re¯nement of forecast targeting
procedures represents the best hope at present for putting the insights provided by
that theory into practice.
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